Choice of Law as General Common Law: A Reply to Professor Brilmayer by Green, Michael S.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2012
Choice of Law as General Common Law: A Reply
to Professor Brilmayer
Michael Steven Green
William & Mary School of Law, msgre2@wm.edu
Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Green, Michael Steven, "Choice of Law as General Common Law: A Reply to Professor Brilmayer" (2012). Faculty Publications. 1366.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1366
The Role of Ethics in 
International Law 
Edited by 
DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III 
Pepperdine University School of Law 
...,:< ..... CAMBRIDGE 
::: UNIVERSITY PRESS 
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, 
Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City 
Cambridge University Press 
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA 
ww1v.cambridge.org 
Information ou this title: www.cambridge.org/978no7o96554 
© Cambridge University Press 2012 
This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception 
and to the provisions of relevaut collective licensing agreements, 
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written 
permission of Cambridge University Press. 
First published 2012 
Printed in the United States of America 
A catalog record {<n this publication is available from the British I ,ibrary. 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data 
The role of ethics in international law I [edited by j Donald Earl Childress, IlL 
p. em.- (Asil studies in international legal theory) 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
ISBN 978-1-1o7-o9655-4 (hardback) 
L International law- Moral and ethical aspects. L Childress, Donald Earl, 1975-
KZ1256.R65 2011 
341- dc22 20llol28t6 
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLS for 
external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication ancl does not guarantee 
that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. 
5 Choice of Law as General Common Law: 
A Reply to Professor Brilmayer 
Michael Steven Green 
I TRODUCTIO 
In the first footnote of her chapter, Lea Brilmayer mentions "significant over-
lap" with two recent papers of mine. If anyone should be making acknowledg-
ments, I should . She has long argued that the law of choice of law, even in its 
modern interest-analysis incarnations, is a disguised form of general common 
law, and that it ought to be reformed in the spirit of Erie. 1 In taking up this 
argument myself, I am in her debt. 2 
To get the basic idea, consider a varia tion on Kuchinic v. McCrory ) Assume 
a Georgia pilot invites another Georgian to Ay with him to attend a football 
game in ew York. On the way the plane crashes in Pennsylvania. A Georgia 
statute prohibits guests from suing their hosts for negligence. Pennsylvan ia law 
has no such prohibition. Had it enterta ined the action, the G eorgia Supreme 
Court would have applied Pennsylvan ia law to the facts . However, the guest 
chooses to sue the host in Vermont state court instead. May it apply Georgia 
law? 
Under every choice-of-law approach currently used by state courts - from the 
First Restatement to modern interest analys is- the mere fact that the Georgia 
Supreme Court would not apply Georgia law does not prohibit the forum from 
doing so. A state supreme court's refusal to apply its law to interjurisdictional 
fac ts does not bind sister states. 
' Indeed, she is probably the first to make thi s argument. Lea Brilmayer, "Methods and Objectives 
in the Con Aict of Laws: A C hallenge," Mercer Law Review 35 (1984): 555-563, precedes umy 
Kramer, "Return of the Renvoi ," New York University Law Review 66 (1991): 979-1044. 
' I a lso owe a debt to Larry Kramer and particula rly to Kim Roosevelt, who e article Kern1it Roo-
sevelt Ill, "Resolving Renvo i: The Bewitchment of Our Inte lligence by M eans of Language," 
Notre Dame l .aw Review So (2005): 1821-1891, started me thinking about these matters. 
l See 422 Pa. 6zo (1966). 
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Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is commonly understood as standing for the 
propos ition that a state supreme court is the authority on that state's law.4 
Because it is hard to see why this authority would evaporate when the question 
is the applicability of the state's law to interjurisdictional facts, it looks like the 
Vermont state court must respect the Georgia Supreme C ourt's dec ision not to 
apply G eorgia law. T his duty of deference is not merely part of proper conflicts 
law; it is a constitu tional obliga tion , appli ca ble to the Vermont state court by 
means of the Full Faith and Credit C lause.5 (We can call this obligation 
"hori zonta l Erie," to di stinguish it from its vertical equi va lent.) 
One te rminological quibble: As Professor Brilmaye r desc ribes it, respec ting 
a state supreme court's choice-of-law dec isions amounl·s to accepting renvo i. I 
di sagree. Under the doctrine of renvoi, the Vermont state court should apply 
Pennsylvania law, because that is the law that wou ld be c hosen by the Georgia 
~See Erie Railroad v. '/'ompkin, , 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
; I mgue that federal courts' v:rie obligations apply hori zontally, by means of the Full Fa ith and 
C redit C lause, to sta te courts inte rpreti ng siste r state law in Part II of Michae l Steven Green , 
"Hori zontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law," Michigan Law Review 109 (20 11 ): 1237-
1291 (he reinafter Green, "Horizontal"). I furthe r mgue th<lt horizont<l i Erie compels a state 
court to respect sister state choice-of-law dec isions when dete rmining whethe r sister state law 
applies in Pa rt IV of Michael Steven G reen, "Erie's Suppressed Premise," Minnesota Law 
Review 95 (20 11 ): 1111- 11 69 (he re ina fter G reen , "Suppressed"). Kim Roosevelt gives a sim ilar 
a rgument at Roosevelt, "Resolving Renvoi," 1841 , 1856-1857. As Professor Bri lmayer makes 
clear in he r reply, however, I should not have attributed these views to her. She is agnosti c 
a bout whether a constitutional du ty to defe r to a siste r sta te's choice-of-law decisions exists. 
Although anyone skeptica l about the idea ofh ori zontal/•:rie should examine my argument in 
G reen, "H orizonta l," I would li ke to brieRy defend my position in the face of the disana logies 
Professo r Bri lmaye r identifies between ve rtica l l•:rie and the Full Fa ith and C redit C lause. 
She is quite right that verti ca l l<rie obliga tes a federa l court sitting in di ve rsity to use the 
forum state's statute of limitati ons (or, more accurate ly, the limitations that would be used by 
a forum state court) and no comparab le hori zontal obl iga ti on arises unde r the Full Fa ith and 
C redit C lause. Nonetheless, a dist·incti on should be drawn between the constitutional and the 
nonconstitutionall<rie doctrines. G reen, "Horizontal," S !.1 ; see also Byrd v. Blue l{idge Rural 
Elec. Coup., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-537 (1958); Adam N. Ste inman, ·'what is the l•:rie Doctrine? 
(And W hat Does It Mea n fo r the Contemporary Politics of judic ial Federali m?)," Notre Dame 
l .aw Review 84 (2oo8): 316-327. It is the nonconstitutional Erie doctrine 1'11at obliga tes a federal 
court to use the forum state's st<l tute of limitati ons, as a means of avo iding foru m shoppi ng 
and the inequita ble administrati on of the laws. See /Ianna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 46o, 467-468 
(1965). My argument in G reen, "Hori zontal," is th<ll on ly the constitutional Erie doctrine has 
its horizontal equi va lent in the Fu ll Fa ith and C redit C lause. 
Professor Bri lmayer is a bso lu tely right, however, tha t the Full Fa ith and C red it C lause 
cannot obliga te a state court to respect a sister state's choice-of-law rules if these ru le a re 
conceived of as procedura l, along the lines of statutes of li mitations. Another very important 
di fference between us, the refore, is that, like Larry Kramer and Kim Roosevel t, I think that 
choice-of-law ru les can be substanti ve. See G reen, "Suppressed," Part· IV; Kramer, "Retu rn ," 
1043-1044; Roosevelt, "Resolving Renvo i," 1883. 
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Supreme Court.6 However, renvo i itself looks incompatible with horizon tal 
Erie, because the choice of Pennsylvania law is made without regard for the 
decisions of the Pennsylvan ia Supreme Court. Proper deference to the Georgia 
Supreme Court is shown by concluding not that Pennsylvania law applies, but 
only that Georgia law does not. 
I agree with Professo r Brilmayer that horizontal Erie compels the forum 
to defer to a state supreme court's choice-of-law dec isions when determining 
whether the state's law applies.7 Nonetheless, I'm not going to defend our 
position here. My goal is the more modest one of identifying two obstacles tha t 
our position must overcome. The first, of which I am sure Professor Brilmayer 
is aware, is that deference can genera te puzzles when two state supreme courts 
would apply one another's law. The second obstacle is, I think, even more 
serious: Lack of deference to a state supreme court's choice-of-law decisions 
might be compatible with hori zontal Erie, for the simple reason that the state 
supreme court doesn 't want deference. 
After describing these two obstacles, I'll end by making a few observations 
about two different themes in Professor Brilmayer's chapter: her advocacy of 
the common law method in choice ofla w and her worry that choice of law is 
necessarily committed to some "unidentified Archimedean vantage point. " 
1. TH E PUZZLE OF MUTUAL DEFERENCE 
Let us assume that sister states must always respec t a state supreme court's 
dec ision not to apply its law. So our Vermont state court cannot apply Georgia 
law if the Georgia Supreme Court would apply Pennsylvania law. But what if 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply Georgia la w? It looks like the 
Vermont court is prohibited from applying both Pennsylvan ia and Georgia 
law. How shoul.d it respond to this legal void, given that it probably lacks the 
power to fil l it wi th Vermont law? 
One possibility is that it should dismiss for failure to state a claim .8 However, 
isn' t that still the applicati on of law (in effec t, Georgia law)? After all , doesn 't 
dismissal for failure to state a claim mean that the plaintiff is not legally entitled 
to relief? Perhaps it should instead dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, without 
getting to the merits. 
6 Or rather, it should apply Pennsylvania law under the doctrine of renvoi , assuming th<lt its 
choice-of-law ru les point to Georgia law. 
7 Once again , Professor Brilmayer has made it clear that she takes no stand about whether there 
is such a constitutiona l duty of deference; see note 5· 
K See Roosevelt, "Resolving Renvoi," 1884-1886. 
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Is it reall y true, however, that the supreme courts of Georgia and Pennsyl-
vania have decided that the ir laws do not apply to the fac ts? Weren' t the ir 
dec isions predica ted on an error (indeed, a constit·utionally prohibited error), 
namely that the law of the other state could be applied? If, however, each state 
supreme court has no t yet dec ided the matte r, how is the Vermont court to 
determine how they will dec ide it, given that the dec i ion of each depend 
cruc ially on what the other will do? 
It may be because of the puzzle of mutual deference tha t Professor Brilmaye r 
says that renvoi is a "useful tool," rather than an infallible guide, to the scope 
of sister state law. Like Larry Kramer and Kim Roosevelt, she may be arguing 
that a state supreme court's choice-of-law dec isions only sometimes bind sister 
states. As Kramer and Roosevelt understand it, choice-of-law rules come in two 
fl avors: rules of priority and rul es of scope.9 If a sta te supreme court chooses 
not to apply its own law, it·s dec ision binds siste r states only if it was based on 
a rule of scope. 
Con icie r a state supreme court employing inte re I analys is. If it concludes 
that no forum interest would be advanced by applying its law, it employs a rule 
of scope. It is saying, in effect, that the fac ts do not fall under its law. Because, 
uncler horizontal Erie, it is the authority on the matter, its dec ision binds sister 
sta tes . However, Kramer and Roosevelt argue, when it chooses another state' 
law beca use it thinks that state's inte rests are greater than its own, its decision 
does not bind sister states .'0 It has not held that its law does not apply to the 
fac ts, only that its law, despite applying, should not be given priori ty to the 
law of the other state . Sister states are entitl ed to have their own views on that 
questi on. 
Kramer and Roosevelt di sagree about whethe r the traditi onal approach, as 
exemplified in the First Restatement, consists of rules of priority or rules of 
scope . Kramer thinks the traditional approac h assumes that the fac ts are within 
the scope of th e compe ting states' laws simply by undertaking the choice-of-
law inquiry. As a result, the First Res tatement consists of rul es of priori ty and 
a tate supreme court's adoption of the First Restatement does not bind sister 
states ." 
9 T he tenm are Roosevelt's. Ibid., 187 1. 
'
0 Although it was inAuenced by interest analysis, they both argue that the Second Restatement 
consists only of rules of priority, because it does not have an explicit two-step inqui ry in which 
state in te rests are fi rst identi fied and then con Aicts between those in terests are resolved. It 
instead adopts a one-s tep approach that takes into account both state interests and means of 
resolving conAicts of interests. See Heslalemenl (Secrmd) o{Conflicl o{l .ow.~ (St. Pa ul : American 
Law Institute, 1971), ~ 6 ; Kra mer, .. Retu m," 1041- 1043; Roosevelt, "Resolving Renvoi," 1877, 
1886. 
11 Kratner, "Return / ' IO£t2-I043-
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In contrast, Roosevelt argues that historically the traditional approach 
saw choice-of-law rules as enforc ing preexisting limits on states' law-making 
power.' 2 If a First Restatement court refuses to apply its tort law to an accident 
because it occurred out of state, it has concluded that its law cannot apply 
(even though it might in fact have law-making power as a constitutional mat-
ter). Because the First Restatement consists of rules of scope, a state supreme 
court's decision to adopt it binds sister states.' 3 
Kramer and Roosevelt's approach would solve our puzzle of mutual def-
erence if the Georgia Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
applied one another's law as a result of rules of priority, not rules of scope. In 
such a case, the Vermont court would be free to use its own rules of priority 
to choose between Pennsylvania and Georgia law. Indeed, it could choose 
Georgia law even if the Pennsylvania and Georgia Supreme Courts' rules of 
priority agreed that Pennsylvania law should be applied. 
onetheless, Kramer and Roosevelt's approach cannot solve the problem of 
two state supreme courts that refuse to apply their own law as a result of rules of 
scope. Assume that the Georgia Supreme Court wouldn't apply Georgia law 
because it accepts the First Restatement; further assume that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, employing interest ana lys is, wou ldn't apply Pennsylvania law 
because it thinks Pennsylvania has no interest. If Roosevelt is right about the 
First Restatement consisting of rules of scope, then the Vermont state court is 
once again faced with a legal void.'4 
11 . IS THE CE ERAL COMMON LAW I COMPATIBLE WITH ERIE? 
The puzzle of mutual deference is not the only obstacle that must be overcome 
by any approach that demands deference for state supreme courts' choice-of-
law decisions. There is another obstacle that is even more serious. 
As Professor Brilmayer accurately describes it, prevailing choice-of-law 
approaches are urreptitiously committed to the general common law. AVer-
mont state court can ignore what the Georgia Supreme Court says about the 
'
1 Roosevelt, "Resolvi ng Renvoi," 1878-1879. '3 Ibid., 1882-1884. 
4 One might argue that if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used interest analysis, it would 
not concl ude that Pennsylv.mia law does not apply at all, but only that it does not apply 
concerning the question of whether there is an affirmative defense on the basis of the guest-
host relationship. ee Larry Kramer, ''The Myth of the 'Unprovided-For' Case," Virginia Law 
Review 75 (1989}: 1056-106o. After all , Pennsylva nia does have an interest in applying the res/ 
of its tort law, as a means of di couraging plane crashes in Pennsylvania . Even if that is true, 
though, there remains the legal void concerning the affirmative defense. One cannot say that 
the allirn1ative defense is or is not available without applying law - and there is no law to 
apply. 
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applicability of Georgia law to interjurisdictional facts beca use Georgia law 
(a t leas t in its territorial scope) is treated like the general common law was in 
Swift v. Tyson. 
T he obstacle is this: T he Swifl"ian conception of the general common law 
was probably compatible with re pect for state supreme court dec isions con-
cern ing the common law applicable in the tate- if such respec t is understood 
as giving these dec isions the binding effect their crea tors wan ted them to have. 
The same thing is also LTUe of the Swiftian general common law of choice of 
law. 
Swift concerned the appropriate common law rule to apply to a bill of 
exc hange that had been accepted in ew York. As we all kn01 , Justice Story 
did not cons ider himself bound by the dec isions of ew York tate courts 
on t·he matter. One reason, however, was that New York state courts did not 
think their decisions bound federal (or sister state) courts. As Story put it, "It is 
observable, that the courts of New York do not found their dec isions upon this 
point, upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or anc ient local usage; but they 
deduce the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law."'5 Story 
thought he was LTea ting ew York decisions exactly the way that their creators 
wanted them to be trea ted. How can that be incompatible with Erie? 
I think that Story was right that New York state courts did not expect their 
general common law decisions to bind sister state and federal courts. The best 
evidence is the way they would have decided a general common law case 
arising in a sister state, such as Pennsylvania. Like th e federal court in Swift, 
they would have ignored the decisions of Pennsylvania state courts. '6 This 
suggests that they thought their own decisions on the general common law 
were not binding on federal or sister state courts either.'? 
The sa me point applies to the general common law of choice of law. All state 
supreme courts ignore the choice-of-law decisions ofs i ter states when deciding 
whether sister state law can be applied. That suggesl·s that they think their own 
choice-of-l aw decisions can be ignored by si ter state courts.'8 By ignoring 
'' ee Swift v. Tyson, 4 ' U.S. t, 18 (1842). '6 Green, ''Suppres eel ," SS I. z- 1.3. 
'7 Even stronger evidence emerged aft er Swi(lwas decided. New York courts fa vora bly cited Swift 
as allowing them to ignore the genera l common law decisions of sister states- even though in 
Swi(l , of course, it was New York decisions that were ignored. See 11aulkner v. li ar/., 82 .Y. 413 
(188o); St. iclwla,, 13cmk v. Stale at'/13ank, 27 N.E. 849,851 (N.Y. 1891). 
'
8 Professor Brilmaye r suggests th<Jt a state supreme court, thinking that it has gotten the principles 
of the com mon law right , might demand that si ter states follow its decisions, even though it 
ignores the decisions of sister states. I think it is entirely possible that a state supreme court 
might hold such l l view. Indeed in Green, ''Suppressed," Sl.l, I argue that the proper method 
of howi ng deference to state supreme court decisions is a stale-by-slate approach, in wh ich 
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the choice-of-law decisions of a sta te supreme court, preva iling approaches 
to choice of law give these dec isions exactly the deference that their creator 
intends them to have (namely none).'9 
111. THE COMMON LAW METHOD 
Let us set as ide these two obstacles to consider two other important themes in 
Professor Brilmayer's chapter. The first is her endorsement of what she calls 
"the common law method" in choice oflaw. (I'll call it "the method" for short. ) 
As I understand her, the method describes how a state court determines the 
applicability of domestic law. Rather than answering the question by reference 
to a priori principles of legislative jurisdiction (as the First Restatement does) or 
to essentially unan werable questions oflegislative intent (per interest analysis), 
it should decide whether its law applies on the basis of precisely the same sort 
of ethical concerns that it uses when making domestic common law in other 
areas. Here I think she has, with one possible exception, go tten things exac tly 
right. 
As Brilmayer herself recognizes, tl1e method is more of a description of 
what courts are doing, rather than what they ought to do . Because the metl1od 
has room for "vested rights and state interests," all state courts have arguably 
already been using the method, despite themselves. However, that does not 
mean that accepting the method would have no consequences, for it gives state 
deference is ta ilored to what the re levant state supreme court wants. That the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court refuses to defer to sister states' decisions does not mean that its decisions can be 
ignored, for it may demand deference. evertheless, l think that it is clear that states committed 
to the general common law did not hold such a view. The reason is that the very idea of the 
general common law was of a standard that could not be fixed by state (or federal) court 
decisions. ln the example Professor Brilmayer envisions, in which the Pennsylva nia Supreme 
Court demands deference to its decisions, it is denying that the general common law applies 
in Pennsylva nia. 
The evidence that state courts did not consider their decisions binding on sister states is 
particularly strong with respect to choice of law. As Professor Bri lmaye r per uasively demon-
strates, under both the Fi rst Re tatement and interest analysis, a sister state's choice-Qf-law 
decisions are not binding on the forum when it decides whether sister state law applies. States 
that adopt the First Restatement or interest analysis- without some caveat that this lack of 
deference should not apply to their own choice-Qf-law decisions- must have licensed sister 
states to ignore their decisions. lt is particularly revealing that no state court using the Fir t 
Restatement or interest analysis has, to my knowledge, ever complained that sister states were 
ignoring its choice-Qf-law deci ions. 
'9 l believe that this obstacle can be overcome only by arguing that Erie limi ts a state supreme 
court's abili ty to free sister state (and federal ) courts of the duty to defer to its decisions. For a 
discu sion, see Creen, "'Suppressed," Part ll. 
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courts grea ter freedom in the choice-of-law arena than they currently think 
they have. They could continue their adherence to the First Restatement or 
orthodox interest analys is, but they do not have to. 
Because she describes the method as taking into account, inter alia, "the 
substantive policy (actual or presumed) of the laws vying for applica tion," it 
might appear as if it is used by the fomm to determine the applicability of sister 
state law as well. However, when assess ing sister state law, the forum has none 
of the freedom that it has in connection with domes tic law. It can apply sister 
state law only if th e sister state's supreme court (using its own version of the 
method ) would say that sister state law applies . The point is merely that the 
fomm , in deciding whether its own law should be used, can take into account 
sister state interests. 
l think Brilmayer herself may have slipped, however, when describing how 
the forum should determine the existence and slTength of these sister state 
interests, for she appears to think that conceiving of them objectively - that 
is, in a manner independent of the dec isions of the sist·er state's courts - is 
contrary to the lesson of Erie. Here is how she puts it: 
When cons idering the interests of other states under the common law 
method, however, a judge acts with the awareness that a state's law is nothing 
more than wha t the state courts say it is. She or he should not assess the other 
state's definition of its interests for objec tive validi ty, but instead accept that 
definiti on on the grounds that each state formulates and interprets its own 
laws. 
I think this is a mistake. There is nothing wrong with an objec tive determina-
tion of sister state interests, provided that it is being used to determine whether 
domestic law should be applied. 
To see why this is the case, consider the actual facts in Kuchinic v. McCrory. 20 
One Pennsylvanian invited another to Ay with him to a football game in 
Florida .21 The plane crashed in Georgia. 22 Once aga in , a Georgia guest statute 
wou ld have barred the plaintiff's ac tion , and Pennsylva nia law would have 
allowed it. 23 In Kuchinic, the negligence suit aga inst the pilot was being enter-
tained by a Pennsylvania state court, wh ich used interest analys is to apply 
Pennsylva nia law to the fac ts."~ 
The court's dec ision was defended by Peter Westen on the bas is of an 
objec tive conception of sister sta te interests. The fact that a Georgia court 
20 See 422 Pa . 620 (1966). 
22 Ibid., 621. 
'4 Ibid., 623. 
" Ibid ., 622. 
2> Ibid., 622. 
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would employ Georgia law to the fac ts, he argued, does not mean that Georgia 
is really intere ted: 
[l]f the forum dec ides that a foreign state is interested in a case by looki ng 
to that state's conflicts law, it subordinates its own choice of law to that 
of a foreign state, however archaic the latter may be. To do so frustrates 
the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Instead, as Currie himself 
adm itted, the forum should assume final responsibili ty for deciding whether 
another tate is properly interested in the facts at issue. The forum ultimately 
makes such a finding not by asking whether the foreign state declares itself 
to be interested, but rather by asking whether- in light of forum poli cy -
that declared interest seems reasonable. Ultimately, the forum imputes those 
policies to a foreign law which it could conceive a rational foreign court 
adopting, were that foreign court deciding the case at hand .'S 
Both Kramer and Roosevelt have criticized Westen here,'6 and it appears that 
Brilmayer would as well. Nonetheless , in the context of a Pennsylvania court's 
decision about whether it hould apply Pennsylvania law, Westen's comments 
are correct. The court is not bound by what Georgia courts might say about 
Georgia interes ts. 1t is free to conclude that Georgia has no real interes t and 
thus that Pennsylvania law should be applied. 
Of course, if the question is whether it is permitted to apply Georgia law, 
a reliance on ob jective interests is misguided. A Pennsylvania court may not 
point to Georgia's objective interest as a reason to apply Georgia law when the 
Georgia Supreme Court has sa id Georgia law does not apply. In such a case, 
however, the mistake is not rea lly claiming that Georgia has an interest when 
it does not, but applying Georgia law when the Georgia Supreme Court has 
sa id its law does not apply. 
Now as an advoca te of a particular version of the method, with its own 
distinctive conception of sister state interests, Brilmayer is free to insist that the 
forum should defer to a sister state supreme court's decisions when determining 
whether the sister state has an interest. However, she cannot claim that this 
conception of sister state interests foll ows from horizontal Erie. 
1v. THE U AVO IDABLE METAPHYSICS OF CHOICE 
The next theme is in curious tension with the lesson of hori zon tal Erie in 
choice of law. Brilmayer suggests that "recourse to norms or concepts that are 
' 5 Peter Kay Westen, Comment, "False ConAicts," Califomia Law Review 55 (1967): 85. 
'
6 Kramer, "Return ," 1003; Roosevel t, "Resolving Renvoi," 1856. 
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not grounded in positive law may be an unavoidabl e fact of life for choice-of-
law decision making." C hoice-of-law doctrine seeks to provide a "meaningful 
choice" between two competing states' laws - one that does not beg the 
question to be dec ided- and that requires some "unidentified Archimedean 
va ntage point. " The law of choice of law st·<nts looking like general common 
law after all . Or, at the very leas t, it cannot be solely positive law. Here I'd like 
to defend Professor Brilmayer aga inst herself. 
Consider, once aga in, our Vermont state court's choosing between Georgia 
and Pennsylvan ia law. Let· u assume, however, that the Georgia Supreme 
Court would have applied Georgia law and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would have applied Pennsylvania law. Under horizonta l Erie, the Vermont 
court is free to choose which law applies. Brilmayer claims that in making a 
choice between two states' laws, "[ t]he only pos itive law sources to turn to ... 
are the two states whose domes tic substantive laws are under consideration. " 
However, that is clearly fal se here. The relevant principles on the basis of 
which t·he court would choo e are part of the positive law of Vennont. 
Of course, in creating and employing this law, the Vermont court hopes to 
track independent norms. For example, it might seek to apply the law of the 
state that has the greater interest- and whether Georgia or Pennsylvania has 
a grea ter interest is not something over which Vermont has authori ty. But any 
law worth its salt seeks to track independent norms. Law is crea ted for reasons 
and its crea tors hope that they have gotten the reasons right. Vermont's law of 
choice of law is no more metaphysically committed than any other Vermont 
law is. 
Perhaps the problem bothering Brilmayer arises when a court chooses 
between its own law and the law of a sister state. Let us return to Kuchinic, in 
which the Pennsylvan ia Supreme Court is considering whether to apply Penn-
sylva nia or Georgia law. To the ex tent that it is choosing in this case, it appears 
that it must be standing outside the very law over which it has authority. 
The puzzle might be put· thi way. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the 
authority concerning the territorial scope of Pennsylvania law. However, when 
engaging in choice-of-law reasoning, it arguably seeks to occupy a perspec tive 
other than that of the expos itor of the scope of Pennsylvania law. It seeks to 
choose between Pennsylvania law and Georgia law. 
On the one hand , even if it does seek to occupy this perspective, l do not 
see why that means that there is some una vo idable metaphys ics of choice. 
Under Kramer and Roosevelt's approac h, for example, if the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court concludes that the facts fall under the scope of Pennsylvania 
law (and it predicts that the Georgia Supreme Court would say the same abou t 
Georgia law), it is free to choose, on the bas is of a rule of priority, between 
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the two. Like the Vermont state court's, its rule of priority has a source in 
domestic law. 
On the other hand , assume that Kramer and Roosevelt are wrong and 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reasoning does not involve a two-step 
approach . That would mean denying that it can occupy a standpoint inde-
pendent of Pennsylvania law to choose between Pennsylvania and Georgia 
law. In choo ing whether to use Pennsylvania law, it is inescapably decid-
ing whether Pennsylvania law applies. If this is the case, then once again its 
decision wou ld be guided by principles that are part of the positive law of 
Pennsylvania . Of course, in relying on these principles, it probably hopes to 
track considerations existing independently of its authority. As we have seen, 
though, that is true of all law. 
